Battle for the Ca De River Bridge

 

August 4th & 5th, 1965 - The ESSO Tank Farm Battle

 Researched and Recorded by

Sgt. Karl Lippard, USMC, Ret. Colorado Springs, CO

This report was compiled from various documents provided by Karl Lippard and assembled by Dan Withers.

This is a collection of historical material to share the story of the attack by the VC on the ESSO Fuel Farm located near DaNang Harbor. Sgt. Karl Lippard was ashore at the time we were called to support Marine operations. This page is an attempt to put together his recollection and what ever we can locate from Stoddard crewmen to tell the story.

My personal Diary for August 4 and 5 showed the following:
Aug 4 - Sat in Monkey Cove all day in support of Marines. No firing. Got message to proceed to Danang Harbor. Vietcong blew up the ESSO fuel depot tanks and we fired 408 rounds at them.  
 
Aug 5 - In harbor all day. Steamed on patrol all night. 
 
Stoddard DeckLog for August 4th. 
                   
Page 1  Page 2  Smoke from the Tank Farm area at first light Aug 5th
 
Mr. Lippard has these opening comments about that night from his experience there.
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I have learned a lot about that attack and where the VC were being trained some 3 miles maybe 4 upstream. After the loss of the 7th they seemingly just could not put a battalion together. Most certainly from conscripts from the local area. Most if not all were dead now. I surmise that Navy had a suitable effect on moral after killing the 7th VC. So they decided to take out the Esso plant with sappers.

I was there and recall that as my chapter on the bridge is a composite not knowing dates or times then. But I was unaware that 2 ARVNs were killed at the bridge on record on the 4th of  August? USS Stoddard did a lot of firing. I confirm with NGF record of 410 rounds.

In my study here you can see my questions as to if I called it or the one previous. The answer is in the illumination number. I called continuous illumination to lite the battlefield. Here we see Navy record of 10 rounds over the period. Even if they consolidated the rounds it is not enough to match the rounds I called. The overall number is correct in estimation. But no WP and only 10 illumination isn't me. Also the co-ordinances area in keeping with Esso plant firing. And some generic shooting on route of approach. The Navy record of NGLO or Navy liaison for firing is curious too. It could be that Gen Walt put a Navy FO in there after the 28th? A good idea if Gen Thi would let him do that. But somebody was in there. I just don't know who. It is before ANGLICO, the Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company. They were activated in May of 1965 under  Lieutenant Colonel George H. Albers in Hawaii. But general military reference records show Lt. Wasco  started the ball on 30 Aug 1965. The only name I have. BUUUT, there was a NGFS team with 3Bn 12th Marines that landed on the 18th of Aug for Starlite. They were with Kilo Company 3Bn/3rd Marines. They were not used in the attack (Gen. W.M. Greene to Karl and records) but used to soften up some areas to memory on the 20th. 

So, either Navy invented some people as a liaison or used UDT12 who was there since April. 3rd Recon (me) and I can check 1st Force Recon, did the Red Beach 1 & 2 surveys before landing on Red Beach 2. That is why I noted the depth of the ships. Sand bars and shallow measurements were taken there in April before my battalion landed. So whomever called this fire is questionable. Not me. And when we read G-3 ordered the firing it kind of hinted it me. Caused me to look close. But I think the General was winging it. And looking at the grids so the fire was safe for civilians. Meaning they did not know where the enemy really was exactly in the dark. I would never give a four digit grid co-ordinance. Ever! Not near these civilian concentrations.

So this study cannot be me. If asked my opinion, I would say (against orders) NGLO was just written, but the ship in NGF record was ordered to fire 300 rounds on these grids, the 4 digit grids above noted below. That was against 7th Fleet orders to the CG of III MAF Gen. Walt. I understand it. I see it. But he had H/2/3 on the Ca De bridge that could call that. Or I could have called it put it that way. So I don't get it really. On the far left below it says who on record the fire was for. Check Air-13 where it shows the NGF numbers in the margin and see if it says H/2/3 in support. No one on the Ca De bridge called from H/2/3 Naval Gunfire. That suggests me. But the rest doesn't match nor those co-ordinances on record. I would say (as happened in Starlite) that to "Make it official" H/2/3 was written "in support of." And with two dead on the bridge north side, one could say it made "right of defense" a legal mission. 

If you want me to write a tactical brief and emergency call to battle for the USS Staddard I will based on me being there and reference all records in support of text....Deck log I'm afraid will tell us little but worth a look. JG's are not allowed to think much less write much in the ships log. 

 Best regards,

Karl Lippard 

3d Div

two Coord

Air-13

AT910853

Ca De

G-3 orders

3Div/Arvn

2200H

4-Aug-65

Division

USS Stoddard

NGF-14

AT9086

Ca De

G-3 orders

Main Body

on 2 companies VC

"

AT9087

Ca De

G-3 orders

"

AT9088

Ca De

G-3 orders

3rd/ARVN

2230H

4-Aug-65

Division

USS Stoddard

NGF-15

300

Emergency

Ca De

G-3 orders

HE Fuse quick

2 VC companies

Ship adjust

"NGLO/Karl?"

0105H

5-Aug-65

Requested 

USS Stoddard

NGF-16

Fire

Ca De

"NGLO"

"NGLO/Karl?"

0200H

5-Aug-65

Requested 

USS Stoddard

NGF-17

10

AT930887

Ca De

"NGLO"

Continuous

3d Div

0212H

Cease

USS Stoddard

NGF-18

AT936870

Ca De

"NGLO"

3d Div

0415H

5-Aug-65

Open

USS Stoddard

NGF-19

40

AT9186

Ca De

"NGLO"

"NGLO/Karl?"

0424H

5-Aug-65

Requested

USS Stoddard

NGF-20

60

AT9187

Ca De

"NGLO"

Battle End

0439H

5-Aug-65

Cease

USS Stoddard

NGF-21

410 rds

confirmed

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FSGT Howard asked if Lt Reeder could have called that. I will ask but not really possible from the south bridge position. Also the order to fire by NGF record shows division ordered fire on those grids. Grids are 1500 meters square!! Someone higher than a Colonel onshore would have to own that one. No one does that. We are trained differently.

And here it is in a nut shell. DO officers go to Map and Aerial Photo School? Only if they become an FO. And frankly no time other than a day of mapping at OCS. Office Cadet school. SO the Company Commander sends who he thinks is best suited to learn. The company uses him. If lucky the CO has a FO always with him why? Because the FO was trained for the job. And if no FO, who? The man he picked to train.....And we see it again at M/3/9. What Corporal did they pick as Platoon Commander? The man calling artillery and mortars in the company. The man trained for the job...See what I mean. Marines plan the need and the Company Commander selects his men for each job. Most important is a machinegun Squad Leader, and FO. Those were my two jobs. Jobs known in 3rd Plt at the bridge. Could I have called that?  Yes. But the Platoon Commander in my opinion was not threatened and unless ordered to call it would not have that authority to do so. In  the other battle, we were being over run. I called for support. Division sent two ships and "ARVN" was in need of assistance. I fired that mission in self defense. That call was mine, division supported, then enemy destroyed called cease fire. Shoot until the spotter is done. Mission accomplished as ordered. I am sure you can see the difference.  

Deck log says more than I would have expected. Not totally correct in rounds but it does say you were shooting. The details of who ordered the ship on station and to fire fuse quick. That is a Major General and WWII language. 

The other battle co-ordinances were written in my book in 1982 when no records were available. Then you match division G-2/G-3 and NFS records, lay them on the page and you see the map is a match. And the only man who knows those co-ordinances is the man who put them on paper in 1982 your USS Stoddard and the USS Craig firing on the 28th/29th July.


Best regards,

Karl Lippard

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