learned a lot about that attack and where the VC were being
trained some 3 miles maybe 4 upstream. After the loss of the 7th
they seemingly just could not put a battalion together. Most
certainly from conscripts from the local area. Most if not all
were dead now. I surmise that Navy had a suitable effect on
moral after killing the 7th VC. So they decided to take out the
Esso plant with sappers.
there and recall that as my chapter on the bridge is a composite
not knowing dates or times then. But I was unaware that 2 ARVNs
were killed at the bridge on record on the 4th of August?
USS Stoddard did a lot of firing. I confirm with NGF record of
study here you can see my questions as to if I called it or the
one previous. The answer is in the illumination number. I called
continuous illumination to lite the battlefield. Here we see
Navy record of 10 rounds over the period. Even if they
consolidated the rounds it is not enough to match the rounds I
called. The overall number is correct in estimation. But no WP
and only 10 illumination isn't me. Also the co-ordinances area
in keeping with Esso plant firing. And some generic shooting on
route of approach. The Navy record of NGLO or Navy liaison for
firing is curious too. It could be that Gen Walt put a Navy FO
in there after the 28th? A good idea if Gen Thi would let him do
that. But somebody was in there. I just don't know who. It is
before ANGLICO, the Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company. They were
activated in May of 1965 under
Lieutenant Colonel George H. Albers in Hawaii. But general
military reference records show Lt. Wasco started the ball
on 30 Aug 1965. The only name I have. BUUUT, there was a NGFS
team with 3Bn 12th Marines that landed on the 18th of Aug for
Starlite. They were with Kilo Company 3Bn/3rd Marines. They were
not used in the attack (Gen. W.M. Greene to Karl and records)
but used to soften up some areas to memory on the 20th.
So, either Navy invented some people as a liaison or used UDT12
who was there since April. 3rd Recon (me) and I can check 1st
Force Recon, did the Red Beach 1 & 2 surveys before landing on
Red Beach 2. That is why I noted the depth of the ships. Sand
bars and shallow measurements were taken there in April before
my battalion landed. So whomever called this fire is
questionable. Not me. And when we read G-3 ordered the firing it
kind of hinted it me. Caused me to look close. But I think the
General was winging it. And looking at the grids so the fire was
safe for civilians. Meaning they did not know where the enemy
really was exactly in the dark. I would never give a four digit
grid co-ordinance. Ever! Not near these civilian concentrations.
So this study cannot be me. If asked my opinion, I would say
(against orders) NGLO was just written, but the ship in NGF
record was ordered to fire 300 rounds on these grids, the 4
digit grids above noted below. That was against 7th Fleet orders
to the CG of III MAF Gen. Walt. I understand it. I see it. But
he had H/2/3 on the Ca De bridge that could call that. Or I
could have called it put it that way. So I don't get it really.
On the far left below it says who on record the fire was for.
Check Air-13 where it shows the NGF numbers in the margin and
see if it says H/2/3 in support. No one on the Ca De bridge
called from H/2/3 Naval Gunfire. That suggests me. But the rest
doesn't match nor those co-ordinances on record. I would say (as
happened in Starlite) that to "Make it official" H/2/3 was
written "in support of." And with two dead on the bridge north
side, one could say it made "right of defense" a legal mission.
If you want me to write a tactical brief and emergency call to
battle for the USS Staddard I will based on me being there and
reference all records in support of text....Deck log I'm afraid
will tell us little but worth a look. JG's are not allowed to
think much less write much in the ships log.